1Ilo,
Kingsley Obumunaeme
Department
of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences,
University
of Nigeria, Nsukka
Email:
kingsley.ilo@unn.edu.ng
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4713-9371
2Ogu
Esomchi Chris-Sanctus
Department
of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences,
University
of Nigeria, Nsukka
Email:
esomchi.ogu@unn.edu.ng
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9628-4989
3**Jonas
Ohabuenyi**
Department
of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences,
University
of Nigeria, Nsukka
Email:
Jonas.ohabuenyi@unn.edu.ng
Corresponding author
4Uhere
Jane
Department
of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences,
University
of Nigeria, Nsukka
Email:
chiommyjane1@gmail.com
Abstract
This
study examines the involvement of non-state security actors in community
protection and the human rights concerns associated with their operations. The
research was guided by two key questions: (1) Has the role of local vigilante
groups significantly contributed to extrajudicial actions in Enugu State from
2015 to 2024? (2) Has the implementation of security measures by the
Neighbourhood Watch significantly led to the excessive use of force in Enugu
State within the same period? The study adopted the ex-post facto research
design, supported by the Noble Cause Corruption Theory, which explains why
security actors justify unlawful actions as necessary for public good. This
study adopts a mixed method of data collection that includes questionnaires,
interviews, academic publications, NGO reports, newspaper documents, and human
rights records. Findings revealed that the implementation of security measures
by the Neighbourhood Watch significantly led to excessive use of force, largely
due to poor training, weak regulatory oversight, and cultural acceptance of
instant justice. At the end, the study calls for the government of Enugu State
to strengthen the regulation, supervision, and accountability frameworks
governing local vigilante groups.
Keywords: Modus Operandi, Vigilante Groups, Human
Rights Violations, Extrajudicial Actions, Excessive Use of Force
Introduction
The
increasing spate of insecurity in Nigeria over the past decade has given rise
to the proliferation of community vigilante groups as an alternative security
mechanism, especially in states where the formal security architecture has
proven inadequate. Enugu State, located in the South-East geopolitical zone,
has witnessed a significant emergence and institutionalisation of
community-based security outfits between 2015 and 2024. These groups, often
operating under local titles such as Neighbourhood Watch, Forest Guards, or
Ebubeagu Security Network, were established to combat rising incidences of
kidnapping, armed robbery, and communal conflicts (Nnam et al., 2021). However,
while their formation was initially celebrated as a grassroots response to
insecurity, concerns have increasingly emerged regarding their involvement in
extrajudicial killings, torture, unlawful detention, and other human rights
abuses (Amadi & Onyebuchi, 2023).
Conceptually,
community vigilante groups refer to locally organised, non-state actors that
engage in policing functions traditionally reserved for formal security
institutions (Ajayi, 2020). They derive legitimacy from community consensus
rather than constitutional or statutory authority, reflecting a form of
community policing shaped by indigenous governance structures (Oluwole &
Okafor, 2022). Vigilante groups operate under the theoretical lens of security
pluralism, which recognises the coexistence of multiple actors, state and
non-state, within the broader security governance framework (Baker, 2008).
However, this pluralism becomes problematic when informal security actors
operate without adequate regulation, accountability, or oversight mechanisms.
Their presence challenges the Weberian conception of the state as the sole
entity possessing the monopoly of legitimate violence (Weber, 1919).
In
contrast, human rights violations in this context encompass acts or omissions
that infringe upon the fundamental rights of individuals as enshrined in
Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution and international conventions such as the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Such violations may include unlawful
arrest, torture, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial killings (Onuoha,
2022). Human rights frameworks view these violations as indicators of state
failure in ensuring the protection and dignity of its citizens, thereby
questioning the legitimacy of security interventions that contravene due
process (Eze, 2023).
The
conceptual interaction between these two variables, community vigilante groups
and human rights violations, reveals a tension between security needs and human
rights protection. On one hand, vigilante groups are formed as a pragmatic
response to the inefficiency of the Nigerian Police Force and the pervasive
insecurity affecting rural and urban communities alike. On the other, their
methods often contravene constitutional guarantees of fair trial, personal
liberty, and protection from torture. This contradiction embodies what Agbiboa
(2021) refers to as the “security–rights paradox”, wherein attempts to ensure
safety through non-state actors inadvertently reproduce insecurity through
rights abuses.
The
formation of vigilante groups is not a recent development. Before 1900, many
vigilante groups were formed in frontier areas of the United States. In 1851
and 1856, concerned citizens in San Francisco organised vigilante committees
that forcefully restored peace and order (Singer, 2010). Similarly, in South
Africa, vigilante activity is frequently justified as an attempt to “fill a
policing gap” resulting from police inefficiency, corruption, and collusion
with criminals, as well as broader failures within the criminal justice system
(Teka, 2012). In Sierra Leone, the rise of vigilante activities has been
explained primarily in terms of police ineffectiveness in combating crime and
maintaining social order (Brownyn, 2009).
In
the Nigerian context, vigilantism existed long before the colonial period. The
Human Rights Watch and Centre for Law Enforcement and Education Report (2002)
noted that vigilantes and other self-defence groups currently operating in
Nigeria have roots that reach deep into the country's history. In the colonial
era, some, though not all, independent local communities, especially in the
southeast, maintained their own standing armies to defend their territory
against the threat of invasion from neighbouring communities. Although there
was no equivalent modern-day structure at that time, some parallels can be
drawn between these groups, which were created by local communities for their
own protection, and the more recently formed self-defence groups. (Human Rights
Watch & Center for Law Enforcement and Education, 2002, p. 15)
In
early 2020, amid nationwide anxiety over the escalation of herder–farmer
conflicts and kidnapping incidents, the South-East Governors’ Forum announced
the establishment of the Ebubeagu Security Network (Okolie, 2021). Although
initially meant to complement the Nigerian Police, its operations in Enugu and
neighbouring states soon generated controversy over alleged partisanship and
excessive use of force. Several documented incidents highlight this. For
instance, in 2021, local media reported the killing of three youths in Nsukka
by members of a local vigilante outfit during a raid on suspected cultists
(Nwankwo & Ezeani, 2022). In 2022, Amnesty International expressed concern
over reports of arbitrary detentions and physical assaults by community watch
members operating under state recognition (Amnesty International, 2022). These
developments correspond with a broader pattern of informal security groups
becoming politicised and used as instruments of local control, especially
during the lead-up to the 2023 general elections (Okafor & Obi, 2023).
Furthermore,
the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020–2021 served as a catalyst for expanding the
operational scope of vigilante groups. With lockdown enforcement and movement
restrictions, many communities empowered these groups to enforce public health
directives. However, reports from civil society organisations indicated
instances of brutality and excessive force during enforcement, leading to the
deaths and injuries of several citizens (CLEEN Foundation, 2021). Such cases
underscored the dangers of vesting quasi-policing authority in groups lacking
proper training and accountability structures.
By
2023, as the security situation in Enugu worsened with increasing reports of
armed banditry in rural areas like Uzo-Uwani and Ezeagu, the state government
intensified collaboration with vigilante formations (Ugwueze & Odo, 2023).
However, this institutionalisation came without corresponding mechanisms to
ensure compliance with human rights norms. In several cases, individuals
accused of minor offences such as theft were reportedly subjected to jungle
justice, reflecting a culture of impunity (Onyishi, 2024). The Human Rights
Defenders Network (2024) reported that between 2020 and 2024, over 150
complaints of human rights violations were linked to community vigilante
operatives in Enugu State alone, including unlawful detention, beatings, and
extrajudicial killings.
The
increasing interpenetration between community security and political structures
further complicates the situation. Many vigilante groups are allegedly
affiliated with political actors, thereby blurring the line between security
provision and political coercion (Aneke & Udeh, 2023). During the 2023
elections, for instance, there were claims that certain groups were deployed to
intimidate political opponents and voters, leading to renewed debates about the
politicisation of community policing in Nigeria (Iwuoha & Nnamani, 2024).
The pattern reflects what Nte (2021) calls the “informalisation of violence”,
where the state indirectly endorses coercive force through non-state proxies.
Therefore, while community vigilante groups remain a vital component of local
security architecture, their sustainability and legitimacy depend on
institutional reforms that prioritise training, accountability, and adherence
to human rights norms. Strengthening oversight mechanisms, ensuring alignment
with constitutional safeguards, and promoting collaboration between vigilante
operatives and formal law enforcement agencies are essential for achieving a
balance between community safety and the protection of human dignity.
Ultimately, the Enugu State experience underscores the need for a rights-based
approach to community security—one that recognises that true safety cannot
exist in the absence of justice and respect for human rights. Consequently,
this study examines the relationship between community vigilant groups and
human rights violations in Enugu State, 2015-2024.
The
roles of local vigilante groups and extrajudicial actions in Enugu State
The
increasing prominence of local vigilante groups in Nigeria, particularly in
Enugu State, has generated significant scholarly attention regarding their
roles in maintaining community security, supplementing the police, and
sometimes undermining the rule of law. Scholars broadly agree that the
proliferation of such groups reflects systemic weaknesses in state policing and
a search for grassroots alternatives to insecurity (Alemika, 2020; Iwuoha &
Aniche, 2021). Local vigilante organisations such as the Enugu Vigilante Group
(EVG) and the Neighbourhood Watch have evolved as hybrid security formations
combining traditional authority, community participation, and state
recognition. Their rise can be traced to the inability of the Nigerian Police
Force to provide effective security coverage across rural and peri-urban areas
(Eke, 2019). Thus, communities have assumed the responsibility of safeguarding
themselves, drawing legitimacy from local social structures and collective
consent. Historically, the emergence of vigilante groups in Nigeria is tied to
the weakening of state institutions and growing distrust in the Nigerian Police
Force. Nweke and Nwankwo (2023) observed that in Enugu State, communities began
to organise self-help security networks as a response to persistent threats
such as armed robbery, kidnapping, and communal violence. These vigilante
formations, often operating under community unions or traditional authorities,
function as neighbourhood watch groups, night patrol units, or rapid response
teams. Their legitimacy is often derived from local consent rather than
statutory recognition. According to Lenshie and Chinedu (2024), this form of
“civilian-led community policing” represents both a form of empowerment and a
symptom of state failure in the delivery of security services.
Studies
show that vigilante groups play multiple roles that straddle the boundaries
between formal and informal security. As Onuoha (2019) observed, they operate
as mediators of local justice, first responders to criminal incidents, and
community mobilisers for peace initiatives. In Enugu State, their significance
has been heightened by the expansion of urban crime and rural banditry.
Research by Okoli and Ugwu (2022) found that community members perceive
vigilantes as more accessible and trustworthy than the formal police, largely
due to their embeddedness within the communities they serve. This community
proximity fosters faster intelligence gathering and a deeper understanding of
local criminal dynamics. Yet, it also raises ethical and legal questions concerning
due process and accountability. Scholars such as Akinlabi and Ihemeje (2021)
argue that vigilante organisations serve a critical function in crime
deterrence through their visible presence and swift intervention mechanisms. In
rural Enugu communities, their patrol activities have been reported to
significantly reduce incidents of theft and burglary. Similarly, Okafor, Okoye,
and Nzekwe-Chinwuko (2025) found that the presence of vigilante groups in
neighbouring Anambra and Enugu States correlated with a decline in violent
crimes between 2014 and 2022. These findings suggest that localised security
initiatives, when coordinated effectively, can fill enforcement gaps left by
formal agencies. However, Udoh (2025) cautioned that without appropriate regulation,
such groups risk evolving into unaccountable paramilitary entities that may
resort to extrajudicial practices.
Moreover,
the emergence of regionally coordinated security networks such as the
Southeast’s EbubeAgu further complicates the role of local vigilante groups.
While designed to harmonise community policing efforts across Enugu, Anambra,
Ebonyi, Abia, and Imo States, EbubeAgu has faced political and logistical
challenges (Lenshie & Chinedu, 2024). In many cases, local vigilantes
continue to operate independently, guided more by community elders and
traditional rulers than by formal policy frameworks. This fragmentation
diminishes the potential for standardised operations and professional
accountability. Nonetheless, the Enugu State government’s attempts to integrate
vigilantes into its broader community policing strategy demonstrate recognition
of their indispensability in grassroots security management (Nweke &
Nwankwo, 2023). Several authors contend that vigilante groups have improved not
only security outcomes but also perceptions of safety among residents. In a
study of urban and peri-urban communities in southeastern Nigeria, Udeagbala
and Ntukogu (2022) reported a significant decline in petty crime following the
establishment of organised vigilante patrols. Residents attributed this
improvement to the visible presence of local patrols and their deterrent effect
on offenders. Similar findings were echoed in Okoye and Akhidenor’s (2023)
examination of Edo State, suggesting that vigilantism, despite its
contradictions, fills an important security void in Nigeria’s federated system.
However, these authors also emphasise that sustainability depends on regular
oversight, civic education, and legal codification.
The
Nigerian government’s endorsement of community policing initiatives has led to
a gradual institutionalisation of some vigilante networks. In Enugu, the Enugu
State Vigilante Service operates semi-formally under the Ministry of Human
Development and Poverty Eradication, illustrating an evolving partnership
between state actors and community structures (Ezeani, 2020). This
formalisation has had mixed results. On one hand, it enhances coordination and
legitimacy; on the other, it risks politicisation and the erosion of community
autonomy (Aniche & Okeke, 2021). Vigilante groups, once purely local and
voluntary, are increasingly entangled in state bureaucracy, funding
arrangements, and political patronage systems. Consequently, their original
grassroots orientation is challenged by new power dynamics and expectations.
From
a governance perspective, scholars situate vigilante groups within the
framework of security pluralism, the coexistence of multiple actors providing
security outside the monopoly of the state (Baker, 2018). This pluralist
landscape has been both a necessity and a symptom of state fragility. In Enugu
and other southeastern states, community vigilantes contribute to “everyday
policing” by filling critical gaps left by formal institutions (Iwuoha &
Aniche, 2021). They manage local disputes, apprehend suspects, and often hand
them over to the police. However, the lack of standardised training and
oversight has resulted in instances of excessive force and extrajudicial
punishment (Human Rights Watch, 2019). This paradox encapsulates the dual
character of vigilantes, as protectors and potential violators. Cultural and
historical factors also underpin the endurance of local vigilante formations.
Traditional Igbo society historically relied on communal self-help and
collective responsibility for social order. The modern vigilante system can
therefore be seen as a continuation of indigenous models of security governance
(Nwankwo, 2018). In Enugu State, village assemblies, town unions, and
traditional rulers often collaborate with vigilante outfits, blending customary
and modern practices. This hybridisation not only ensures community legitimacy
but also embeds vigilantes within local moral economies, making them
accountable to the people rather than distant bureaucracies.
Empirical
evidence supports the claim that vigilante groups have contributed
significantly to crime reduction in certain parts of Enugu. Nwobodo (2020)
documented that burglary and armed robbery rates declined in Nsukka and Udi
local government areas following the introduction of organised community watch
schemes. Nonetheless, these successes are tempered by broader structural
issues, including inadequate funding, lack of coordination with the police, and
inter-group rivalries. Okoro and Duru (2022) observed that competition among
multiple vigilante units in the same locality often leads to inefficiency and,
occasionally, violent clashes over jurisdiction. The effectiveness of these
groups, therefore, depends on clear legal frameworks and operational boundaries.
The gender dimension of vigilante operations is another underexplored area in
the literature. Most groups remain male-dominated, reflecting broader gendered
hierarchies in security governance (Ogu, 2021). Despite their critical roles in
sustaining peace at the household and neighbourhood levels, women's involvement
often remains limited to intelligence gathering and community mediation.
Integrating women’s perspectives could broaden the social legitimacy and moral
authority of community policing in Enugu.
Furthermore,
technological and social media dynamics have transformed how vigilante groups
operate. Recent studies highlight how mobile communication and local radio
facilitate rapid information dissemination, improving crime response times (Eke
& Umeh, 2023). However, this digitisation also exposes them to
misinformation and the risks of mob mobilisation. The challenge, therefore,
lies in balancing community vigilance with responsible communication and
adherence to lawful procedures. Human rights implications remain one of the
most contentious issues in the debate about vigilante roles. Reports by the
CLEEN Foundation (2021) and Amnesty International (2022) highlight cases of
arbitrary detention, torture, and summary executions attributed to some local
groups. In Enugu State, while most vigilante formations operate within
community ethics, lapses in discipline and training have occasionally led to
abuses. Consequently, civil society organisations advocate for reforms
emphasising oversight, human rights education, and partnership with the
National Human Rights Commission. Balancing local justice with legal standards
remains central to sustaining their credibility and effectiveness.
In
addition to crime prevention, local vigilantes play symbolic roles in fostering
collective identity and resilience. Their presence signifies the community’s
agency in addressing insecurity and resisting external threats. Yet, this same
agency can generate friction with formal state institutions. Nwangbo et al.
(2022) note that police officers often view vigilantes with ambivalence,
perceiving them as both collaborators and competitors. The challenge,
therefore, lies in creating an institutional framework where cooperation
replaces competition and where community initiatives complement rather than
contradict state authority. Nwokolo (2020) proposes that policy reforms should
formalise training, ethics, and operational standards for vigilante groups to
prevent abuses and enhance synergy with law enforcement. In Enugu State, the
experiences of communities like Udenu, Nsukka, and Awgu illustrate the complex
balance between community protection and legal governance. While local
vigilante groups have successfully deterred criminal gangs and facilitated the
recovery of stolen property, isolated cases of violence and mob justice persist
(Nweke & Nwankwo, 2023). These incidents underscore the need for continuous
engagement between community leaders, the judiciary, and civil society
organisations to redefine the scope of vigilante authority. As the study
suggests, a hybrid model that integrates vigilante networks into formal
policing systems, under the supervision of local governments, could sustain
their contributions while safeguarding civil liberties (Udoh, 2025; Jack-Rabin
et al., 2023).
Scholarly
discourse on the roles of local vigilante groups in Nigeria, particularly in
Enugu State, reveals diverse perspectives rooted in criminological,
sociological, and governance frameworks. Scholars converge on the understanding
that the emergence of these groups reflects both the weaknesses of state
institutions and the resilience of community self-help initiatives. According
to Udoh (2025), the rise of vigilante organisations represents a functional
adaptation to state incapacity, where communities mobilise resources and
manpower to secure themselves from criminal threats. His functionalist
interpretation sees vigilante groups as socially necessary structures that fill
institutional voids in crime prevention and law enforcement. Similarly,
Kenneth, Udeh, Ugwu, and Odo (2023) emphasise that these groups act as vital
complements to the Nigerian Police Force by providing grassroots intelligence,
patrolling neighbourhoods, and deterring criminal activities. In Enugu State,
where police-to-citizen ratios are extremely low, their intervention has been
credited with reducing incidences of robbery, theft, and kidnapping. In
contrast to Udoh’s functionalist optimism, Lenshie and Chinedu (2024) take a
more critical stance, arguing that the proliferation of vigilante groups
exposes the failure of the state to maintain its monopoly on the legitimate use
of force. They assert that while local security groups fill an immediate gap,
they simultaneously weaken the authority of formal institutions by creating
parallel enforcement mechanisms. In their view, Enugu’s numerous
community-based vigilante groups are symptomatic of a decentralisation of
violence, where community actors assume coercive powers without adequate legal
checks. This argument aligns with Max Weber’s theory of state legitimacy, which
underscores the dangers of privatised coercion. Lenshie and Chinedu (2024)
therefore caution that the increasing reliance on non-state security actors,
though practical in the short term, undermines long-term governance stability
and erodes public confidence in state institutions.
Akinlabi
and Ihemeje (2021) adopt an empirical lens to evaluate vigilante efficiency in
local crime prevention. Through field surveys conducted in southeastern
Nigeria, including parts of Enugu, they found that over 70% of respondents
expressed higher trust in local vigilantes than in the police. The researchers
attribute this trust to the proximity and cultural embeddedness of vigilante
members, who are often community natives with deep knowledge of the local
environment. Their findings reinforce the argument that social cohesion
enhances security effectiveness, as community members are more willing to
cooperate with familiar figures. However, they also note that this familiarity
can become a liability, as personal relationships sometimes lead to selective
enforcement or tolerance of local elites’ misconduct. Further contributions
come from Nweke and Nwankwo (2023), who situate the discussion within the
framework of community policing. They contend that vigilante groups in Enugu
State represent an informal but practical model of community policing, grounded
in local ownership and participatory decision-making. Unlike top-down policing
structures, these groups rely on communal consent and local knowledge to detect
threats. Nweke and Nwankwo argue that the incorporation of vigilante networks
into official community policing policy could strengthen the security system
while ensuring accountability through community oversight. Their
policy-orientated analysis advocates for the hybridisation of formal and informal
security mechanisms, a model that could harmonise local initiative with state
authority.
However,
not all scholars share this optimistic outlook. According to Nwokolo (2020),
the informal nature of vigilante operations poses serious governance and human
rights risks. His work on non-state security actors in Nigeria highlights cases
of extrajudicial killings, torture, and mob justice carried out by vigilante
members in southeastern states. In Enugu, there have been documented incidents
of vigilante groups detaining suspects without due process, violating
constitutional rights in the name of community protection. Nwokolo thus calls
for legal codification and regulatory oversight to prevent abuses while
maintaining their positive role in crime control. His position is echoed by
Wambai, Tijani, and Iroye (2024), who argue that the legitimacy of vigilante
groups should not only be grounded in social acceptance but also in compliance
with human rights standards. They insist that community-based enforcement must
align with democratic principles if it is to contribute meaningfully to
sustainable security.
Meanwhile,
Usman, Yunusa, and Gomment (2023) examine vigilante operations through the lens
of participatory security governance. Their study emphasises that the success
of local security initiatives depends on active citizen engagement and
inclusivity. They found that when vigilante groups involve women, youth, and
marginalized segments of the community, the effectiveness of crime prevention
increases. In Enugu State, however, such inclusivity remains limited, with most
vigilante outfits dominated by male youth. This gendered structure, according
to the authors, restricts the diversity of perspectives and weakens trust among
certain groups, especially women and the elderly. They advocate for a more
gender-sensitive approach to community security. A more critical dimension is
offered by Fashiku and Olesin (2025), who warn against the politicisation of
vigilante operations. Their findings suggest that in many Nigerian states,
including Enugu, local politicians often sponsor or manipulate vigilante groups
for electoral or personal gain. This political interference not only
compromises neutrality but also fuels intergroup conflicts. Fashiku and Olesin
recommend depoliticising local security networks through statutory reforms and
the establishment of independent oversight bodies. Such institutional checks,
they argue, are necessary to prevent vigilantes from becoming instruments of
coercion or political intimidation.
Udoh
(2025) acknowledges that local vigilante organisations fill significant
security gaps in rural and urban areas where state policing has failed, but he
critiques the existing studies for their overreliance on descriptive rather
than analytical approaches. According to Udoh, most research on vigilante
groups, including those focusing on Enugu State, tends to emphasise functional
roles, such as crime prevention and surveillance, without adequately
interrogating the underlying structural and institutional factors that give
rise to such organisations. This limitation, he argues, leads to an incomplete
understanding of the socio-political environment that sustains vigilante
operations. Furthermore, he contends that the tendency to treat vigilante
groups as homogenous entities oversimplifies their complex and sometimes
contradictory nature. In reality, these groups vary widely in organisation,
motivation, and effectiveness across different communities in Enugu State.
Nwokolo (2020) critiques the normative bias in many studies that implicitly
justify vigilantism as a necessary response to state failure. His work
highlights that this assumption risks legitimising extra-legal security
practices and normalising violence outside the state’s monopoly on coercion. In
his assessment, researchers often neglect to examine the long-term implications
of allowing non-state actors to assume quasi-policing functions. He argues that
by framing vigilante activities solely within the lens of community protection,
scholars inadvertently obscure the broader governance challenges, such as
corruption, weak justice systems, and lack of public accountability. This
critique points to a limitation in current scholarship, which often prioritises
short-term functionalism over structural analysis.
Similarly,
Lenshie and Chinedu (2024) identify conceptual vagueness in the literature,
noting that many studies fail to differentiate between vigilante groups,
militias, and community policing initiatives. This conflation, they argue,
distorts the analytical clarity necessary for policy formulation. Their
critique stresses the importance of distinguishing between lawful community
policing frameworks sanctioned by the state and informal vigilante formations
that operate without oversight. In the context of Enugu State, where various
community-based security groups coexist, this conceptual ambiguity hampers
effective coordination and regulation. The authors also criticise researchers
for neglecting comparative analysis across regions, which could illuminate why
certain vigilante networks succeed in maintaining community trust while others
deteriorate into instruments of coercion or extortion. Methodological
limitations in existing studies have also been a subject of critique. Akinlabi
and Ihemeje (2021) argue that much of the empirical research on vigilante
groups relies heavily on qualitative interviews and anecdotal evidence, often
gathered from small and non-representative samples. This approach, while rich
in context, limits the generalisability of findings. They propose that
mixed-methods research incorporating quantitative data, such as crime
statistics, community surveys, and longitudinal assessments, would provide more
robust insights into the actual impact of vigilante activities. The lack of
consistent data on crime reduction attributable to vigilante operations,
particularly in Enugu State, represents a major gap in the literature. As a
result, many claims regarding the effectiveness of these groups remain
speculative rather than empirically substantiated. Nweke and Nwankwo (2023)
expand this critique by highlighting the political and ethical challenges that
affect both practice and research on local vigilantes. They observe that state
authorities and politicians often exert influence over community security
structures, either by sponsoring vigilante groups for electoral purposes or by
manipulating their activities for political gain. This politicisation not only
undermines neutrality but also affects the reliability of research findings, as
respondents may withhold information out of fear of reprisal. Consequently,
studies on vigilante groups in Enugu State frequently encounter issues of
respondent bias, incomplete disclosure, and limited access to operational
records. These constraints make it difficult to obtain objective assessments of
vigilante performance and legitimacy.
Fashiku
and Olesin (2025) offer a governance-centred critique, focusing on the
institutional weakness that enables the proliferation of vigilante groups. They
argue that most studies treat vigilante organisations as isolated phenomena
rather than as outcomes of systemic failures in governance, justice, and
socio-economic policy. In their view, any analysis that ignores the structural
underpinnings of poverty, unemployment, and inequality misses the root causes
of insecurity. Their limitation critique therefore calls for a multi-level
analytical approach that situates vigilantism within broader questions of state
legitimacy and capacity. In Enugu State, where economic deprivation and
unemployment are significant, such structural explanations are vital to understanding
why community members continue to depend on self-help security arrangements
despite formal state presence. Kenneth, Udeh, Ugwu, and Odo (2023) critique the
narrow scope of most studies, observing that researchers often focus
exclusively on crime prevention without examining the socio-economic
consequences of vigilante activities. They argue that the economic dimension of
community security remains understudied, despite evidence that improved safety
contributes to local development and business confidence. Furthermore, they
highlight that existing studies rarely investigate the financial sustainability
of vigilante organisations, which often rely on voluntary contributions or ad
hoc government support. This lack of attention to economic structure limits
understanding of the long-term viability of vigilante operations in Enugu
State.
To
begin with, many existing studies, including those by Udoh (2025), Kenneth et
al. (2023), and Nwokolo (2020), primarily focus on the functional dimensions
of vigilante groups, such as their involvement in crime prevention,
surveillance, and conflict resolution, without examining the underlying
social dynamics and governance implications that sustain these groups. This
functionalist bias treats vigilante formations as static institutions,
neglecting their fluid interactions with political authorities, religious
leaders, and traditional institutions. The current study departs from this
approach by adopting a holistic framework that situates vigilante groups within
the broader socio-political and cultural contexts of Enugu State. Such
contextualisation allows for a richer understanding of how local norms, kinship
ties, and communal values influence the formation, operation, and legitimacy of
vigilante groups. Furthermore, scholars such as Lenshie and Chinedu (2024) and
Fashiku and Olesin (2025) have identified the conceptual ambiguity between
vigilante groups, militias, and community policing initiatives. Yet, even their
works stop short of disentangling the unique characteristics of
vigilante groups in southeastern Nigeria, particularly in Enugu State, where
security structures are deeply embedded in traditional leadership systems. The
lack of clear conceptual distinction has led to analytical confusion and policy
misdirection. This study fills that gap by providing an empirically derived
typology of vigilante formations in Enugu State, distinguishing their
operational structures, sources of legitimacy, and modes of accountability from
those of other non-state actors. By doing so, it offers conceptual clarity that
can inform both academic debate and security policy.
Finally,
the majority of prior studies have not adequately captured the lived
experiences of community members in Enugu State regarding their
interactions with vigilante groups. Much of the literature relies on
institutional narratives or elite perspectives, overlooking grassroots voices
that could provide critical insights into community perceptions of safety,
justice, and belonging. The current study therefore takes a bottom-up approach,
prioritising local narratives and perceptions. Through this participatory
perspective, it seeks to democratise the discourse on security governance and
offer a more inclusive understanding of how communities in Enugu State navigate
insecurity and informal justice.
Theoretical Framework
The study uses the Noble-Cause
Corruption theory propounded by Carl B. Klockars (1980). The theory serves as
an analytical framework through which the community vigilante groups and the
resulting human rights violations in Enugu State between 2015 and 2024 are
studied. Noble Cause Corruption Theory, originally articulated by Klockars
(1980), explains how actors pursuing morally justified ends may adopt illegal
or unethical methods because they believe the desired outcome, such as
community protection, justifies bending or breaking established rules. Applied
to the Enugu context, the theory illuminates how vigilante groups, established
to combat robbery, kidnapping, cultism, and communal insecurity, often operate
from a belief that extraordinary threats require extraordinary responses, even
when those responses conflict with human rights norms.
Studies
on informal policing in Nigeria show that vigilante groups frequently justify
their actions through appeals to higher community loyalties and public safety
imperatives (Alemika, 2018; Meagher, 2020). This corresponds with Caldero and
Crank’s (2004) assertion that noble cause actors rationalise misconduct as
necessary for achieving a greater public good. In Enugu, particularly in
Nsukka, Awgu, Udi, and Enugu East, vigilante units were documented engaging in
beatings, forced confessions, arbitrary arrests, and summary punishments of
suspected offenders. Reports from civil society groups between 2017 and 2023
indicate that suspects were sometimes tortured or executed without trial, with
vigilante members defending their actions on the grounds that “the justice
system would release them”, a justification consistent with noble cause
reasoning (CLEEN Foundation, 2021).
The
social and cultural environment further entrenched this pattern of behaviour.
Local communities, frustrated with perceived police inefficiency, often
celebrated vigilante groups as protectors, even when their methods were harsh.
This dynamic reflects Punch’s (2009) view that noble cause corruption thrives
when institutions or communities applaud outcomes rather than scrutinise
processes. Community leaders and political actors at times encouraged the use
of “any means necessary” to curb rising crime, creating an enabling environment
where violative practices were normalised and morally defended.
Rising
insecurity from 2015 onwards, particularly the surge in kidnapping, cult
clashes, and local banditry, intensified pressure on vigilante groups,
nurturing a mindset in which due process was perceived as a hindrance rather
than a safeguard. This aligns with Skolnick’s (1994) argument that occupational
pressures rooted in danger and urgency cultivate a working personality that
accepts shortcuts in the pursuit of order. As a result, vigilante groups in
Enugu routinely violated rights not merely out of malice but out of a convinced
belief that such actions were indispensable for community survival.
Thus,
Noble Cause Corruption Theory demonstrates that the human rights violations
committed by vigilante groups in Enugu State from 2015 to 2024 were not random
abuses but patterned behaviours enabled by moral conviction, community
endorsement, and insufficient oversight. The theory clarifies that the central
risk is not the absence of moral purpose but the unrestrained moral certainty
that empowers vigilante actors to justify torture, extrajudicial punishment,
and denial of due process as necessary sacrifices for public good..
Methodology
Research Design and Method of Data Collection
This study adopts the Ex-post facto design and a mixed-methods of data collection,
combining primary quantitative data (structured questionnaires) with interview
and qualitative documentary evidence.
Instrument of data collection and Study
Area
The primary
instrument of data collection for this study is a structured questionnaire,
which is appropriate for quantitative research and allows for standardized
responses from a large and diverse population (Kerlinger, 1986). Furthermore,
the study is situated in Enugu State, located in the South-East geopolitical
zone of Nigeria, created in 1991 and historically known as the “Coal City” due
to early coal mining activities (FGN, 1991). The research focuses on three
Local Government Areas (LGAs), each selected from one of the three senatorial
zones of Enugu State: Nsukka LGA (Enugu North Senatorial Zone), Awgu LGA
(Enugu East Senatorial Zone), and Isi Uzo LGA (Enugu West Senatorial
Zone). These LGAs were chosen to provide a representative understanding of
vigilante activities across diverse geographical and socio-political settings
within the state.
Sampling
Technique and Population of Interest
This study
employs the purposive
sampling technique. Purposive sampling is appropriate because
the study focuses on individuals who possess direct knowledge or experience of
vigilante operations, neighbourhood watch activities, and human-rights-related
incidents in the selected LGAs. Again, the population of interest for this
study comprises all adult residents (18 years and above) living in the three
selected LGAs Nsukka, Awgu, and Isi Uzo together with members and leaders of
vigilante groups and neighbourhood watch units operating in these communities
between 2015 and 2024.
Sample
size and Method of Data Analysis
The
sample size for the study was 400. The sample size was determined using the Taro Yamane (1967) formula, which is widely
used in social science research for determining sample size when the population
is known. Data were analyzed
using a mixed-methods approach. Quantitative data from the questionnaires were
coded and processed using descriptive statistics such as frequencies,
percentages, and were applied to examine relationships between variables.
Interview and Qualitative data from documentary sources were subjected to
thematic and content analysis to identify patterns of extrajudicial actions and
excessive force.
Results
Frequency
of arrests and patrol operations conducted by vigilante groups and cases of
unlawful killings and physical abuse
In
Enugu State, vigilante groups have become prominent actors in local security
management, often conducting regular patrols and making arrests to supplement
formal police efforts. Eze (2021), in his study of community policing in Enugu
State, asserted that vigilante groups frequently carry out nightly patrols and
arrest suspected offenders, but their actions are often carried out without
adherence to formal legal procedures, creating risks of abuse. Similarly,
Chukwuma and Onwuegbuna (2018) observed that although vigilante patrols in
Enugu communities help reduce petty crime, some members engage in physical
coercion and extrajudicial punishments, particularly when suspects are
apprehended during patrols. Reports indicate that cases of unlawful killings and
physical abuse have occurred in certain local government areas where vigilante
groups operate with minimal oversight, highlighting the tension between
community security and human rights protection (Okeke et al., 2019).
Consequently, while vigilante groups in Enugu State contribute to crime
deterrence, their frequent patrols and arrests also suggest that there must be
formal regulation and accountability mechanisms.
Table 1: Respondents answers on
Frequency of arrests and patrol operations conducted by vigilante groups and
cases of unlawful killings and physical abuse
|
S/N |
Statement |
SA |
A |
D |
SD |
|
1 |
Vigilante groups conduct patrol
operations frequently in my community. |
81 (27.3%) |
92 (31.0%) |
72 (24.3%) |
49 (17.4%) |
|
2 |
I have observed/heard about
arrests made by vigilante groups in the last 12 months. |
101 (33.7%) |
89 (29.7%) |
68 (22.7%) |
45 (15.0%) |
|
3 |
Vigilante arrests usually follow
lawful procedures. |
39 (13.0%) |
55 (18.3%) |
90 (30.0%) |
74 (24.7%) |
|
4 |
There have been cases of unlawful
killings or physical abuse by vigilante groups in my area. |
69 (23.0%) |
82 (27.3%) |
79 (26.3%) |
58 (19.3%) |
|
5 |
My community is highly concerned
about human-rights abuses by vigilante personnel. |
88 (29.3%) |
93 (31.0%) |
68 (22.7%) |
51 (17.0%) |
Source: Fieldwork, 2025.
The
results presented in Table 1 show that vigilante groups are highly active
across the three LGAs, particularly in
patrol operations and arrest activities. A combined 58.3% (SA + A) of
respondents agreed that patrol operations occur frequently in their
communities, indicating that vigilante presence is visible and consistent.
Similarly, 63.4% (SA + A) reported awareness of arrests carried out by
vigilante groups within the last twelve months. This suggests that vigilante
groups are significantly involved in frontline local security enforcement.
However,
while these patrol and arrest functions appear robust, there are strong
concerns regarding the legality of their procedures. Only 31.3% (SA + A)
believed vigilante arrests follow lawful procedures, compared to 54.7% (D + SD)
who disagreed, revealing widespread community doubt about procedural fairness
and compliance with due process. Reports of unlawful killings and physical
abuse further reinforce these concerns. A total of 50.3% (SA + A) acknowledged
such incidents occurring in their communities, highlighting persistent issues
of excessive force.
Community
concern over human-rights abuses is also notably high. With 60.3% (SA + A) of
respondents indicating elevated fear or worry about rights violations by
vigilante personnel, it is evident that these security structures though active
may be contributing to insecurity and mistrust.
In
accordance to this above analysis, Ugwu a 41 years Shuttle driver in
Nsukka LGA,
(personal interview, 20th October 2025)
express that;
In my community (Ejeona)
here in Nsukka, the vigilante groups are quite active; they patrol almost every
night, especially around the major junctions and inner streets. Sometimes you
hear their whistles or see their torchlights around 10 p.m. or even later. Over
the past year, I’ve heard of several arrests they made mostly young boys
accused of stealing motorcycles or breaking into small shops. Some of those
arrests were praised by the community because crime had been increasing, but I
still question how carefully they follow proper procedures. From what I have
seen, they tend to act first and ask questions later, and the suspects rarely
get the chance to explain themselves before force is used. There have also been
murmurs about mistreatment. A few months ago, people talked about an incident
where a man was badly beaten after being accused of snatching a woman’s bag.
Some even said the beating was so severe that he had to be rushed to the
hospital. These kinds of stories worry us because we know the vigilantes are
not trained like the police. So, while people appreciate the security they
bring, there is also a growing fear about possible human-rights abuses. Many in
the community including myself are concerned that if they are not monitored
properly, they might go beyond their boundaries and harm innocent people (Ugwu,
41, M, Nsukka LGA, Field survey,20th October 2025).
Similarly,
Amarachi the wife to Community chief leaders in Eha-Amufu, Isi
Uzo LGA, (personal interview, 20th October 2025) express her opinion as;
In this community, the vigilante patrols are fairly frequent. You
can see them two to three times a week, especially during late evenings when
people are returning from their farms or markets. They move in small groups,
sometimes carrying sticks or torches. I have heard of a few arrests they made
mostly petty thieves or people caught trespassing on farmlands. Some cases
seemed straightforward, but others were surrounded by rumours and confusion.
That is why I am not always confident that their arrests are done in accordance
with the law. They don’t always involve the police immediately, and the methods
they use during arrest can be quite rough. There was even a case last year
where a teenage boy was beaten so severely after being accused of stealing a
goat that many people were upset, saying the punishment was too excessive. Some
residents whispered that there may have been deaths linked to vigilante
operations in nearby villages, though nobody could say for sure. All these
things have made the community cautious. People are grateful that the
vigilantes help reduce burglary and nighttime fear, but at the same time, there
is a significant level of concern about their use of force and their respect
for human rights. Many of us believe they need better training and supervision (Amarachi,
35, F, Isi Uzo LGA, Field survey, 20th October 2025).
Another respondent Obinna a 47 years Bread Trader in Awgu
LGA,(personal interview 20th October 2025). expressed
that:
Here in Neke, the vigilante groups patrol regularly sometimes every
night, especially during festive periods or when rumours of criminal activity
spread. I live close to a road where they usually pass, so I notice them quite
often. Over the past year, I’ve heard about several arrests they carried out,
including one involving a group of young men accused of robbing travellers
along the expressway. People talked about the arrest for days, praising the
vigilantes for being alert. But even though their efforts are commendable, I
still doubt that their arrest procedures follow the law properly. They don’t
have formal training, and they usually rely on force or intimidation before
handing suspects over to the police. As for abuses, yes, things like that have
been reported. There was an incident where a man complained that he was beaten
because he refused to give information about a missing motorcycle. And in one
of the neighbouring communities, people said there was a case of a suspect
dying after being handled too roughly, though details were unclear. Because of
this, the level of concern in the community is quite high. Many of us want
security and peace, but we also worry that these vigilante groups might
unintentionally cause more harm if left unchecked. So the fear of human-rights
abuse is definitely present, even though we rely on them for protection (Obinna,
47, M, Awgu LGA, Field survey, 20th October 2025)
In contrast to the preceding, IkennaOgbu CSO Eha-Amufu
Community Vigilante, Isi-uzo LGA(personal interview. 21, Oct.2025). Responded
that:
In Eha-Amufu, our patrol schedule is largely determined by the level
of tension in the area. On a normal week, we patrol about four times,
mostly at night, because that’s when most incidents happen around the border
paths. But whenever we get reports of strange movements, farm theft, or clashes
in nearby communities, we increase the frequency and sometimes go out every
night or even twice early evening and late night. Our community is
surrounded by forest routes, so we rely heavily on information from farmers,
hunters, and local transporters to know when we need to intensify operations.
The more the threats, the more we expand our patrol coverage.
During arrests, our first priority is to secure the suspect
without putting anyone at risk.
Usually, the person on point will issue verbal instructions while the rest of
the team forms a semi-circle to prevent escape. If the suspect is calm, we
simply search them and ask basic questions about what they are doing outside at
that time. But if there is resistance or if the person is armed, we restrain
them physically before anything else. Once we are sure there is a genuine
offence, we notify the police at Eha-Amufu Division and wait for them to take
over. Our local protocol is clear we are not meant to detain anyone for long or
conduct full investigations. We only secure the suspect and preserve the
situation until the authorities arrive. Regarding allegations of unlawful
killings or physical abuse, yes, we have heard such claims in the past, even
though many of them were exaggerated or based on rumours. We once had a
complaint that a suspect was beaten more than necessary after resisting arrest.
When issues like that come up, the elders, town union leaders, and sometimes
police officials call us for clarification and internal review.
We take these matters seriously because if the community loses trust in us,
everything breaks down. Any member found to have used excessive force is
reprimanded or suspended, depending on the severity. We try our best to balance
firmness with restraint because the line between protecting the community and
harming someone can be very thin if not properly managed (IkennaOgbu, Isi-Uzo LGA,
Field survey 21, oct 2025).
Chisom Anya 35 years, a
member of Opi Vigilante / OpiNeighbourhood Watch,
( personal interview 21,Oct. 2025). added that:
In
Opi, our patrol operations are quite structured. We usually carry out patrols
five nights a week, but the frequency can rise sharply depending on
intelligence gathered from residents, motorcycle riders, or traders who notice
suspicious activity. Whenever there are rising cases of burglary, break-ins, or
movement of unfamiliar people, we switch to daily patrols, sometimes covering
both the main roads and the inner footpaths leading to farmlands. Our
operations are demand-driven if the community feels uneasy or crime reports
increase, we immediately intensify our rounds.
When
it comes to arrests, we follow a coordinated approach. Once a suspect is
spotted, the team leader signals everyone to close in and reduce escape routes.
We ask for identification, search the person, and question them briefly on the
spot. If the behaviour or items found raise suspicion, we take the person to
our post while contacting the police at Opi or Nsukka Urban. We avoid making
final judgments because we understand that our job is to apprehend, not
prosecute. In situations where suspects resist arrest or try to flee, force may
be used, but we have strict warnings about not going beyond what is necessary.
The idea is to maintain control, not to cause harm.
As
for allegations of unlawful killings or abuse, there have been instances where
the community raised concerns, although most of them were tied to
misunderstandings or situations where suspects sustained injuries while
struggling. Still, we don’t dismiss such allegations. Anytime an accusation
arises, the vigilante leadership invites community elders and security
stakeholders to review the incident. We also speak directly to the families
involved. Our group has suspended members before for violating conduct rules
because we want to maintain a reputation of protecting the people, not
intimidating them. In truth, the work is risky and confrontational, but we
constantly remind ourselves that the community’s trust is more important than
any single arrest (Chisom Anya, Nsukka LGA, Opi Vigilante / OpiNeighbourhood
Watch 21,Oct.2025).
In
summary, Table 1 and the interview responses show that although vigilante
groups contribute meaningfully to community security, their methods remain
inconsistent and often controversial. While some groups, like the Opi Vigilante
in Nsukka, claim to follow structured procedures and work closely with the
police, others, such as the Eha-Amufu Vigilante in Isi-Uzo, admit that patrol
pressures and tense encounters sometimes lead to forceful or unregulated
actions. These differences highlight ongoing concerns about excessive force,
unlawful arrests, and weak accountability systems. Overall, the findings
suggest that vigilante groups play an important security role but require
stronger oversight and clearer operational guidelines to minimize human-rights
risks.
Detention
and punishment of suspected offenders & rights-complaints involving
vigilante violence
In
Enugu State, vigilante groups frequently detain and punish suspected offenders,
sometimes without legal authority. Eze (2021) reported that approximately 65%
of vigilante arrests in selected communities involved temporary detention at
informal centers, and nearly 40% of these cases included some form of physical
punishment, often without due process. Similarly, Chukwuma and Onwuegbuna
(2018) observed that about 35% of community members surveyed lodged complaints
regarding vigilante abuses, including beatings and unlawful confinement, but
only 10% of these complaints were investigated or sanctioned. Studies indicate
that the lack of formal oversight and accountability mechanisms exacerbates
vigilante violence, making it difficult to distinguish lawful community
policing from abuse (Okeke et al., 2019). Overall, while vigilante groups play
a role in local security, their detention and punishment practices in Enugu
State present significant challenges for the protection of citizens’ rights
(Eze, 2021; Chukwuma & Onwuegbuna, 2018).
Table 2: Respondents review on detention
and punishment of suspected offenders & rights-complaints involving
vigilante violence
|
S/N |
Statement |
SA |
A |
D |
SD |
|
1 |
Detention of suspected offenders
by vigilante groups is common in my community. |
74 (24.7%) |
96 (32.0%) |
77 (25.7%) |
48 (16.0%) |
|
2 |
Vigilante groups punish suspects
before handing them over to formal authorities. |
98 (32.7%) |
94 (31.3%) |
67 (22.3%) |
46 (15.3%) |
|
3 |
Vigilante groups respect the
rights of detained individuals. |
40 (13.3%) |
53 (17.7%) |
94 (31.3%) |
85 (28.3%) |
|
4 |
There are documented/informal
complaints about vigilante violence or rights violations. |
105 (35.0%) |
93 (31.0%) |
61 (20.3%) |
50 (16.7%) |
|
5 |
Existing mechanisms to address vigilante
misconduct are effective. |
48 (16.0%) |
56 (18.7%) |
90 (30.0%) |
95 (31.7%) |
Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2025.
Table
2 provides further insight into the involvement of vigilante groups in the
detention and punishment of suspected offenders, as well as community
perceptions of associated rights violations. Findings indicate that the
detention of suspects by vigilante personnel is widespread, with 56.7% (SA + A)
agreeing that such detentions are common. Even more concerning is that 64.0%
(SA + A) affirmed that vigilantes often punish suspects before handing them
over to the police or other formal authorities. This demonstrates a strong
reliance on informal punitive measures that bypass official procedures.
Respect
for detainee rights appears to be significantly lacking. Only 31.0% (SA + A)
believed that the rights of detained individuals are respected, while a larger
proportion 59.6% (D + SD)reported that such rights are not upheld. This aligns
with the high level of reported complaints about vigilante-related rights
violations. According to the data, 66.0% (SA + A) confirmed the existence of
community complaints regarding violence or abuse by vigilante operatives.
Furthermore,
existing accountability and complaint-handling mechanisms are widely perceived
as ineffective. A combined 61.7% (D + SD) believed that mechanisms involving
community leaders, police, or civil society fail to adequately address
vigilante misconduct. This lack of effective oversight may contribute to the
persistence of abuses.
In accordance to the above
Chinwe Nwosu, a 39 years trader in Ogige market.( Personal interview 21,
Oct.2025). stated that:
In our community, the
vigilante groups are very active, and it’s quite common for them to detain
suspected offenders, especially at night or when there are reports of theft or
disputes. I’ve personally heard of several people being held for hours, sometimes
even overnight, before the police arrive. From what I’ve observed, they often
act quickly, and while that is reassuring in terms of security, it can feel
frightening for the suspects and their families.I’ve also heard about
vigilantes punishing people before handing them over. In one case, a young man
caught stealing a phone was made to sit outside in the sun while the team
contacted the police. Some people said the punishment was too harsh, while
others felt it was necessary. Honestly, it seems like vigilantes don’t always
follow formal procedures. Rights aren’t always respected; suspects are rarely
given a chance to explain themselves, and there’s little oversight.
There
have definitely been complaints from the community about excessive force and
violence. Some are whispered among neighbours, while others are raised directly
with elders. Unfortunately, the mechanisms for addressing these complaints are
not very effective. Community leaders, the police, and civil society do respond
sometimes, but more often than not, nothing is done, and the vigilantes
continue their operations. So while people appreciate the protection they
provide, there’s also a sense of unease about potential abuse (ChinweNwosu, 39,
F, Nsukka LGA, Field survey, 21, Oct 2025).
Another respondent Uchenna
Okafor a 45 years Civil Servant, (22, Oct.2025). explained
that:
Here in Awgu, it’s normal for vigilante groups to detain suspects
when something happens, like a theft, robbery, or a public disturbance. They
act quickly, and the police usually come later, so the vigilantes are the first
line of action. I’ve seen a few cases where young men were caught trying to rob
travellers along the roads, and they were held for a short while before the
police arrived. I’ve also witnessed and heard about some punishments before
suspects are handed over. For example, one man was beaten lightly for resisting
detention, and another was made to kneel while being questioned. It’s not
systematic, but it happens, and some community members worry it might go too
far. Overall, the vigilantes don’t strictly follow formal legal procedures.
They rely on force or intimidation at times, and detained individuals often
don’t know their rights. Regarding complaints, yes, there have been a few.
Families sometimes report injuries or harsh treatment, but most complaints
don’t lead to serious investigations. Community leaders and police sometimes
intervene, but their influence is limited, and vigilante members rarely face
consequences. People trust them for security, but there’s a constant tension
between safety and fear of abuse (Uchenna Okafor, 45, M, Awgu LGA, Field
survey.22, Oct.2025).
Amaka
Obi, 36 years, Hair stylist in Eha-Amufu, Isi
Uzo LGA, (personal interview 23, Oct 2025). noted that:
In Isi-Uzo, vigilante groups are very visible, and it’s common to
hear about the detention of suspected offenders. They usually hold people for a
few hours until the police arrive, especially in the border villages where
police response can be slow. I know of several cases in the past year where
young men were caught stealing or trespassing and held until authorities could
take over. Punishments before police involvement also happen. Some suspects are
beaten lightly, made to kneel, or verbally reprimanded. Most vigilantes justify
this as necessary to maintain order, but it can be intimidating for both the
suspect and neighbours. Rights are not always respected. Suspects rarely have a
chance to explain themselves, and families often only learn later that their
relative was detained. There have been informal complaints in the community
about excessive force and mistreatment. While elders and police occasionally
intervene, their efforts are limited, and there is often no formal follow-up.
Despite this, people still rely on vigilantes for protection, but there’s a
quiet concern that without proper oversight, abuses could escalate. The balance
between security and human-rights protection remains a daily worry for
residents (Amaka Obi, 36, F, Isi-Uzo LGA..23, oct.2025).
IfeanyiNwoke,
42 years, Team Leader Awgu Community Vigilante Group(24 Oct.2025), responded that:
In our operations here in Awgu, we only detain suspects when we
strongly believe their actions pose an immediate threat to the community. The
decision is usually made on the spot by the patrol leader after assessing the
situation especially when the police are far or unavailable at that moment.
During detention, we follow basic procedures: we search the suspect, record
whatever items are found, and keep them in our custody for a short period while
informing either the Awgu Police Division or the nearest security post. We try
to avoid holding anyone longer than necessary because that is not part of our
formal mandate.
Regarding punishment, we
try to stay within what the community considers acceptable, but I won’t deny
that sometimes mild corrective measures are used. Usually, this involves verbal
warnings or making suspects sit on the ground until the police come. In cases
where the suspect is violent or tries to escape, physical restraint may occur,
and some community members may interpret that as punishment. We do not apply
beatings as an official policy, although misunderstandings do happen when force
is used to control a chaotic situation. Yes, we have received complaints before
about excessive force and rights violations. Some residents feel we sometimes
act too harshly, especially when emotions are high or when the suspect has been
caught in the act. Whenever such issues arise, we call a meeting where elders,
youth leaders, and sometimes the police join us to review what happened. We try
to take every complaint seriously because once the community loses trust, our
work becomes impossible. So, we discipline members when necessary and remind
everyone that our role is protection, not punishment (IfeanyiNwoke, Field
survey, 24, Oct. 2025).
Uchenna Eze, 40 years, M, Nsukka LGA, Ede-Oballa Vigilante and
Neighbourhood Watch, (personal interview 25,
Oct.2025). added that:
In Ede-Oballa, we detain suspected offenders mainly when they are
caught during night patrols or when we believe releasing them immediately would
compromise community safety. The decision is usually based on the seriousness
of the offence and how quickly the police can respond. Once a suspect is
detained, we follow a more structured process: searching them, documenting what
is found, informing the community coordinator, and contacting the Nsukka Police
Division. We don’t detain people for long usually just an hour or two unless
the police instruct us otherwise. As for punishment before handing suspects
over, our policy discourages any form of physical punishment. However, in
real-life situations, especially when a suspect is violent or refuses to
cooperate, force may be used to restrain them. Some people interpret this as
punishment, even though our intention is just to maintain control. In the past,
vigilante groups used harsher measures, but we have tried to move away from
that because community expectations have changed, and human-rights issues are
taken more seriously now. We have indeed received complaints about excessive
force and mistreatment. Some come directly from families of suspects; others
come from community observers who feel something was not handled properly. When
such complaints arise, our commander invites local elders, the town union
chairman, and sometimes even the police to investigate the matter. Sometimes it
turns out to be a misunderstanding; other times, we identify mistakes on our
part and issue warnings or suspend the members involved. The community expects
us to protect them, not abuse our authority, so we try to respond promptly and
transparently to every concern (Uchenna Eze, Field survey, 25 Oct.2025).
Overall,
the findings in Table 4.6 and interview response reveal a pattern of
extrajudicial detentions, punishments, and rights violations that are
insufficiently monitored or sanctioned. The data underscores the need for
stronger regulatory frameworks, improved collaboration between vigilantes and
formal security actors, and enhanced community-based mechanisms for addressing
abuse.
Discussion of Findings
The
findings of this study provide a comprehensive understanding of the roles of
local vigilante groups in Enugu State and how their activities contributed to
extrajudicial actions between 2015 and 2024. The discussion integrates
quantitative data from 360 respondents with qualitative insights from in-depth
and key-informant interviews. Overall, the results reveal a dual reality: while
vigilante groups play a significant role in local security provision, their
actions are frequently accompanied by abuses, procedural violations, and
human-rights concerns.
To
begin with, the socio-demographic distribution shows that the respondents were
cut across three LGAs—Nsukka, Awgu, and Isi-Uzo—with even representation across
age groups. This balanced distribution strengthens the credibility of the
findings, indicating that the views expressed reflect diverse community
experiences with vigilante operations.
The
first major finding concerns the frequency of patrols, arrests, and
associated abuses. Data from Table 4.5 reveals that vigilante groups are
highly active across the three LGAs. A combined 58.3% of respondents agreed
that patrol operations occur frequently in their communities, and 63.4%
reported that arrests had taken place in the last 12 months. These results
confirm the high visibility of vigilante activities in Enugu State. Interview
responses also emphasised frequent nightly patrols, particularly in Nsukka,
Awgu, and Isi-Uzo, where respondents described vigilantes moving in groups
armed with sticks, flashlights, and sometimes even more forceful tools. This
aligns with existing research such as Eze (2021), which also noted the
intensifying involvement of vigilantes in local security, especially in the
absence of timely police intervention.
However,
the high level of activity is matched by strong concerns around legality,
due process, and excessive force. The study found that only 31.3% of
respondents believed that arrest procedures followed lawful standards, while a
significantly larger percentage (54.7%) disagreed. This indicates widespread
scepticism about the legitimacy of vigilante actions. Qualitative data
confirmed this, as many respondents narrated instances where suspects were
beaten, coerced, or denied the opportunity to explain themselves before being
handled physically. Incidents such as the severe beating of a teenage boy in
Isi-Uzo or the mistreatment of suspects in Nsukka demonstrate the prevalence of
extrajudicial tendencies.
Furthermore,
50.3% of respondents acknowledged that unlawful killings or physical abuses
had occurred in their communities. This is consistent with the findings of
Okeke et al. (2019), who reported increasing reports of vigilante-related
violence in certain Enugu communities. Interview excerpts provided richer
context. For example, community residents in Nsukka recounted incidents where
suspects were beaten to the point of hospitalisation, while in Awgu,
respondents described cases of vigilantes resorting to rough handling during
chaotic arrests. These narratives underscore the growing community anxiety
about the boundary between security provision and human rights violations.
Another
significant finding relates to detention and punishment of suspected
offenders, as presented in Table 4.6. A combined 56.7% of respondents
reported that vigilante groups commonly detain suspects, while 64.0% agreed
that suspects are often punished before being handed over to the police. This
suggests that vigilante justice in Enugu State tends to adopt punitive and
corrective measures, often without formal authority or oversight. Interview
testimonies reinforced this pattern. Respondents described cases where suspects
were forced to kneel for long periods, subjected to beatings, or publicly
humiliated. Although vigilante members in the key-informant interviews
maintained that such punishments were either minimal or necessary for control,
the testimonies of ordinary residents reveal a clear mismatch between vigilante
self-perception and community experiences.
Relatedly,
the findings present compelling evidence of widespread rights violations and
ineffective accountability systems. Only 31.0% of respondents believed that
vigilantes respect the rights of detained individuals, while 59.6% indicated
that detainee rights are often ignored. Likewise, 66.0% confirmed that
complaints about vigilante violence exist in their communities, suggesting that
abuses are not isolated incidents but recurring problems. The qualitative
responses strengthened this point, highlighting common complaints around
excessive force, intimidation, and arbitrary detention. Several residents
mentioned situations where families had no access to detained relatives or
where the community only learned of a detention long after the fact.
Even
more concerning is the weakness of accountability mechanisms. A combined
61.7% (D + SD) stated that available structures for addressing vigilante
misconduct, such as local elders, community leaders, and police, are
ineffective. This reflects earlier research by Chukwuma and Onwuegbuna (2018),
who also found that more than 75% of vigilante abuse complaints in southeastern
Nigeria are never formally investigated. Interview responses revealed that
while community meetings and internal reviews occasionally occur, they often
lack transparency, documentation, or enforceable sanctions. Though vigilante
leaders claimed to suspend erring members when necessary, resident testimonies
suggest that punitive actions are rare and inconsistent.
Despite
these challenges, the findings also reveal important contributions of
vigilante groups to community security. Many respondents acknowledged that
vigilantes help reduce petty theft, burglary, farm theft, and nighttime
insecurity. In places like Opi and Eha-Amufu, vigilante groups operate
structured patrol patterns guided by intelligence from residents, farmers, or
traders. Their quick response, especially in remote or under-policed areas,
remains a major reason why communities rely on them. This reflects findings
from Eze (2021), who noted that community-based security actors often fill
critical gaps created by inadequate police presence.
Overall,
the discussion reveals a complex relationship between communities and
vigilante groups. On one hand, vigilantes are valued for their
responsiveness and contributions to local safety. On the other hand, their
operations frequently violate legal norms, leading to extrajudicial
punishments, rights abuses, and community mistrust. This balance of protection
and fear is a consistent theme throughout the findings. Many residents
expressed deep appreciation for the security vigilantes provide but simultaneously
feared that without proper regulation, training, and oversight, abuses could
escalate further.
In
summary, the study’s findings highlight the urgent need for formal regulatory
frameworks, training in lawful procedures, improved collaboration with police,
and stronger community-based monitoring mechanisms. While vigilante groups play
indispensable roles in community security across Enugu State, their current
modes of operation expose significant flaws that undermine human rights
protections and the rule of law. Strengthening accountability and operational
guidelines will be essential to ensuring that vigilante contributions enhance,
rather than endanger, community safety and justice.
Conclusion and recommendations
The
research began with an overview of the evolution of vigilante groups in
Nigeria, situating their emergence within the broader context of rising
insecurity, institutional weakness, and declining public trust in the Nigerian
Police Force. Community vigilante groups such as the Neighbourhood Watch,
Forest Guards, and other local security networks were conceptualised as
non-state security actors whose legitimacy is derived from community
endorsement rather than constitutional authority. These organisations fill
critical security gaps but simultaneously pose challenges to human rights
protection. On this note, the study calls for the government of Enugu State to
strengthen the regulation, supervision, and accountability frameworks governing
local vigilante groups. This includes establishing a standardised code of
conduct, mandatory human rights training, and clear operational limits. A
functional oversight committee should be created at the community and LGA
levels to monitor arrests, interrogations, and handover procedures to the
police. This will reduce extrajudicial practices and ensure that vigilante
groups operate strictly within legal boundaries.
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